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We study the general equilibrium properties of two growth models with overlapping
generations, habit formation and endogenous fertility. In the neoclassical model, habits
modify the economy￿ s growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in fertility; station-
ary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing population and
output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK speci￿cation, growing population
and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coe¢ cient lie within de￿nite
boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with either declining
consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining population. In both
frameworks, habits reduce fertility: the trade-o⁄ between second-period consumption and
spending for bequests prompts agents to decrease fertility in order to make parental altru-
ism less costly. This mechanism suggests that status-dependent preferences may explain
part of the decline in fertility rates observed in most developed economies.
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11 Introduction
One of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of industrialized
economies is the decline in fertility rates. In developed countries, the transition from rapid
population growth to low net fertility rates began with the onset of industrialization in the
nineteenth century. Birth rates declined faster than mortality rates, yielding a substantial
reduction in net population growth - a phenomenon labelled as the demographic transition.
After World War II, net fertility rates reached exceptionally low levels, and fell short of the
￿ replacement threshold￿even in countries where fertility had traditionally been high - e.g.
Spain and Italy.1 In less developed countries, the fertility transition started in the mid-1960s,
and it was particularly rapid in East Asia.
In spite of institutional di⁄erences, demographic transitions regularly characterized eco-
nomic development throughout the industrialized world. The study of the causal relations
behind the fertility decline attracted the attention of several economists, and the renewed
interest in formal growth theories inspired a new body of literature that analyzes endogenous
population dynamics. A ￿rst strand of contributions focused on the interactions between
birth rates and infant mortality (Ben-Porath, 1976). This view suggests that fertility rates
have interacted with reduced infant-mortality, resulting into reduced net population growth
(Eswaran, 1998). This explanation can be rationalized in models where fertility choices are
driven by an old-age security motive (Srinivasan, 1988; Sah, 1991; Nishimura and Zhang,
1995). When parents expect descendants to provide support to them during retirement, lower
infant mortality reduces the optimal number of children (Jellal and Wol⁄, 2002).
A second body of literature, concentrates on the fertility aspect of the demographic tran-
sition, and incorporates fertility choices in macroeconomic models of long-run growth. In this
framework, initiated by Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker et al. (1990), the number of
children enters the utility function in the same way as an additional consumption good. Vari-
ous explanations for the demographic transition have been advanced. First, declining fertility
rates may be due to technological progress that - through its impact on the demand for human
capital - reverses the relationship between income and population growth with respect to the
regime of Malthusian stagnation (Galor and Weil, 2000). Second, increasing real wages raise
the opportunity cost of having children, and lower fertility generates positive feedback e⁄ects
on economic growth through capital accumulation (Galor and Weil, 1996). Third, there may
be trade-o⁄s between the quality and quantity of children in parents￿desires, that introduce a
bias against quantity due to parents aspirations (Mulligan, 1997), increased longevity (Ehrlich
and Liu, 1991), or interactions between education choices and unobservable skills of children
(Becker, 1991).2 Fourth, fertility decline may be associated with changing patterns in inter-
generational transfers - the so-called Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982). At low levels of
economic development, the average family size is large as transfers ￿ ow from the young to
the old. In developed economies, family size is small as the net transfer ￿ ow is from parents
to children. The idea that population dynamics are governed by the direction of transfers
has been formalized in a recent contribution by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who assume
1Spain and Italy are nowadays among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world. The total
fertility rate fell from around 3 in 1960, to 1:2 in 2000, that is well below the replacement level of 2:1 (Kohler
et al. 2002).
2According to Becker (1991), parents wish to invest in their children￿ s education but cannot raise capital on
the security of their children￿ s unproven ability, so that more able parents prefer quality to quantity.
2that agents choose optimally the amount of transfers to both parents and children, and show
that two-sided altruism generates development paths that are consistent with the Caldwell
hypothesis.3
Empirical evidence and quantitative analyses suggest that each of these views has its mer-
its, though a monocausal explanation for (i) the low fertility rates currently observed in devel-
oped countries, and (ii) the demographic transition experienced by most Western economies,
is unlikely to hold (see Mateos-Planas, 2002; Doepke, 2005; Lagerl￿f, 2006).4 The aim of this
paper is not to challenge previous explanations, but rather to investigate an additional mecha-
nism through which fertility choices might have been a⁄ected by economic development. The
basic idea is that fertility choices interact with status-dependent preferences. In particular,
we argue that habit formation generates reallocation e⁄ects that help explaining the decline
in fertility rates.
In the Barro-Becker framework, most if not all theoretical models assume that intertempo-
ral choices are based on standard time-separable preferences de￿ned over absolute consump-
tion levels. However, there is now a large consensus on the fact that preferences are status-
and time-dependent in reality. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that economic
agents form habits, and tend to assess present satisfaction on the basis of deviations from
the standards of living enjoyed in the past (Osborn, 1988; Fuhrer and Klein, 1998; Fuhrer,
2000; Guariglia and Rossi, 2002). At the theoretical level, a recent strand of literature in-
vestigates the e⁄ects of habits on economic growth in general equilibrium models. In this
framework, habit formation - also labelled as ￿ internal habits￿ , or ￿ inward￿ looking preferences￿
- a⁄ects capital accumulation because agents take their saving decisions by comparing current
consumption with a psychological benchmark, represented by a weighted average of own past
consumption levels (Caroll et al. 1997; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004). Quantitative applica-
tions suggest that status-dependent preferences may explain various stylized facts - e.g. the
hump-shaped time paths that characterized the behavior of saving rates in Japan (Caroll,
2000) and Western Europe in the post-war period (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2007).
Recent contributions relax the traditional assumption of in￿nitely-lived agents, and analyze
the consequences of benchmark preferences in overlapping generations models where consumers
optimize over ￿nite horizons. Abel (2005) studies the e⁄ects of habits and social status on the
allocation of consumption across generations when agents are sel￿sh. Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2007) extend the model of dynastic altruism of de la Croix and Michel (1999) to include habit
formation, and show that habits reduce the willingness of individuals to leave bequests under
exogenous population growth. This result hinges on a general mechanism of reallocation in
life-cycle resources that will be relevant to our conclusions. In particular, we will formalize
the idea that persistently low fertility rates can be induced by status-dependent preferences
because agents internalize previous standards of living into their saving motives and fertility
choices. This reasoning may be linked to the observation that low-reproduction strategies -
i.e. intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status - ceased to be an
exclusive feature of nobility already in the 19th century, as the same behavior gradually spread
3Similarly to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), intergenerational transfers will play an important role in our
results, though there are important di⁄erences in the aim of our analysis and the assumptions of the model.
See section 5 on this point.
4For example, the idea that fertility declined in response to a reduction in infant mortality may be consistent
with observed dynamics in Germany and Sweden. However, in the United Kingdom and France, reduced
mortality followed fertility decline (Doepke, 2005), suggesting that the contribution of observed mortality rates
to the demographic transition is limited in these cases (Mateos-Planas, 2002).
3across the bourgeoisie, land-owners, and other social classes (Johansson, 1987; Haines, 1992).
At the formal level, our analysis may be interpreted as an extended dynastic model with
altruistic agents that includes both habit formation and endogenous fertility. In section 2,
we study consumption and fertility choices in an overlapping generations economy, where
the number of children provides utility in the ￿rst period of life, while second-period utility
depends on the gap between current and previous consumption levels. Agents are altruistic
towards their descendants, and the opportunity cost of fertility is determined by the amount
of bequests that parents give to their children. However, due to habit formation, consumption
choices are biased in favor of second-period consumption, and agents tend to reduce the cost of
bequests. The consequence of this consumption-bias is a reduction in fertility rates: being able
to choose the number of children, agents reduce fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. We investigate the implications for economic growth and population dynamics
under two technology speci￿cations that are standard in growth theory. Section 3 considers
an AK model where the growth rate of aggregate output is independent of habits. In this
framework, growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit
coe¢ cient lie within de￿nite boundaries. Outside the critical interval, positive growth is
associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with
declining population. Section 4 assumes a neoclassical technology with constant returns to
scale. Di⁄erently from the Ramsey model with habit formation and exogenous population
growth (Ryder and Heal, 1973), habits modify the economy￿ s growth rate. While the long-
run equilibrium features constant output per capita, the growth rate of aggregate output is
determined by the equilibrium rate of population growth - which is endogenous, and modi￿ed
by habit formation. In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either
increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. We also
simulate the transitional dynamics, showing that a declining transitional path in fertility rates
arises, and is exclusively due to habit formation. Section 5 discusses the connections between
our results and previous literature, and section 6 concludes.
2 Consumption and fertility choices
In each period, indexed by t, total population Nt consists of No
t old agents and N
y
t young
agents. Young agents supply one unit of work time to ￿rms and save, whereas old agents only
earn capital income as a result previous savings. At the end of period t, each young generates





population at time t + 1 thus equals Nt+1 = N
y
t (1 + nt), and the gross rate of population









Dynastic altruism induces intergenerational transfers in the form of inter-vivos gifts: each
young in period t receives bt units of output and, in turn, will transfer bt+1nt units of output
to his successors. Individual budget constraints thus read
ct = wt + bt ￿ st; (2)
et+1 = rt+1st ￿ bt+1nt; (3)
where c is consumption when young, e is consumption when old, w is the wage rate, and r is
gross interest on previous savings received during retirement. Private welfare for each agent
4alive in (t;t + 1) equals
Wt = U (ct;et+1;nt) + ￿Wt+1;
where U (ct;et+1;nt) represents direct utility provided by consumption levels and the number
of children, and ￿ is the weight being put by each agent on the welfare of each of the successors.






Expression (4) is the typical objective function encountered in dynastic models, where the
degree of altruism, ￿, is analogous to a discount factor imposed at time zero over future
generations￿direct utilities. As shown e.g. by de la Croix and Michel (2002: Ch.5), the
assumption of perfect foresight allows us to re-interpret the sequence of individual optimization
problems as a single in￿nite-horizon problem. In order to analyze the interactions between
habit formation and fertility choices, direct utility will be speci￿ed as
U (ct;et+1;nt) = ￿ u(nt) + u(ct) + ￿v (et+1;ct); (5)
uc > 0; ucc ￿ 0; ￿ un > 0; ￿ unn ￿ 0;
ve > 0; vee ￿ 0; and vc < 0:
The ￿rst element in (5) is a well-behaved utility function ￿ u(nt) where the fertility rate appears
as a normal good. In line with Barro and Becker (1989), having children provides personal
satisfaction, and fertility rates are chosen in order to maximize private bene￿ts. The way
in which we model fertility choices is thus standard in terms of preferences, but the cost of
raising children is speci￿cally linked to our assumption of dynastic altruism. Since ￿ is a ￿xed
weight being put on each child utility, a ceteris paribus increase in the number of kids implies
an increased cost in terms of second-period gifts. Each agent will thus balance higher direct
utility with reduced consumption possibilities in the second period of life, in compliance with
the present-value budget constraint
bt+1nt = rt+1
￿






As regards consumption preferences in (5), u(ct) is direct utility from ￿rst-period consumption,
￿ > 0 is the individual time-preference factor, and v (et+1;ct) embodies the second crucial
assumption of our model, i.e. habit formation. More precisely, v (et+1;ct) represents second-
period utility from relative consumption: for a given benchmark level enjoyed when young,
ct, utility from consumption when old increases with direct consumption (ve > 0, vee ￿ 0)
but is lower the higher is ￿rst-period consumption (vc < 0). Under the assumption of perfect
foresight, the solution to the dynastic problem can be found by maximizing (4) subject to
(6), using the sequences of consumption levels and fertility rates as control variables. The
associated Lagrangean at time t is











5where ￿ represents the dynamic multiplier attached to the individual budget constraint. The
optimality conditions of the consumer￿ s problem read
Lct = 0 ! (uct + ￿vct)nt = ￿￿t+1rt+1; (8)
Lnt = 0 ! ￿ untn2
t = ￿￿t+1rt+1
￿






Let+1 = 0 ! ￿vet+1nt = ￿￿t+1; (10)
Lbt = 0 ! ￿￿t+1rt+1 = ￿tnt: (11)
The crucial conditions linking consumption and fertility choices are thus summarized by
￿t = uct + ￿vct = ￿vet+1rt+1; (12)
￿ unt = ￿tbt+1r￿1
t+1: (13)
Expression (12) is the Euler condition for consumption allocation, a⁄ected by the presence
of habits (vct > 0). Expression (13) characterizes optimal fertility choices, and asserts that
the marginal cost of bequests - discounted by the prevailing interest rate - must equal the
marginal bene￿t from having children, ￿ un. Notice that, in order to interpret bt as ￿ bequest￿ ,
we should impose a non-negativity constraint bt ￿ 0 in each period. For the sake of clarity,
we will concentrate on the characteristics of interior solutions without specifying further con-
straints ex-ante. Since the main results are derived while assuming speci￿c functional forms,
the non-negativity of bequests will be addressed by checking, ex-post, under what conditions
parameters are compatible with positive gifts along the optimal path.5 Let us assume the
following speci￿cations:
u(ct) = logct; (14)
v (et+1;ct) = log(et+1 ￿ "ct); " > 0; (15)
￿ u(nt) = ￿n￿
t ; 0 < ￿ < 1; (16)
where ￿ > 0 is a weighting parameter for fertility preferences. Expression (15) speci￿es habit
formation according to the ￿ subtractive form￿(Alonso-Carrera et al. 2007), which postulates
a precise willingness to overcome previous consumption levels: the higher is " the stronger is
the role of habits in second-period consumption choices. Expression (16) assumes decreasing
marginal utility from the number of children, consistently with fertility models ￿ la Barro
and Becker (1989). As shown in the following sections, assumptions (14)-(16) allow us to
obtain closed-form solutions in the presence of linear returns to aggregate capital, and ensure
analytical tractability while studying long-run equilibria under neoclassical technologies. We
will later argue (section 4.2) that logarithmic additivity in U (ct;et+1;nt) may increase the
generality of our results by ruling out ad-hoc complementarities between consumption and
fertility in individual preferences.
From (14)-(16), the optimality condition (12) implies the modi￿ed Euler equation
et+1 = ct [￿rt+1 + "(1 + ￿)]; (17)
5We choose this strategy because the aim of the present analysis is not to study the operativeness of bequest
motives, but rather the interactions between habit formation and fertility rates in situations where bequests
are operative. Operativeness is studied in detail in de la Croix and Michel (1999; 2002) and Alonso-Carrera et
al. (2007) in related models with exogenous population growth.
6according to which, for a given interest rate, the ratio between second- and ￿rst-period con-
sumption is higher the stronger is the degree of habit formation. As may be construed, the bias
in favor of second-period consumption generates reallocation e⁄ects that modify optimal fer-
tility choices. Studying these interactions, and their consequences for economic development,
is the central aim of our analysis.
Since technological speci￿cations matter for the nature of the results, we will consider two
central paradigms in growth theory, i.e. neoclassical technologies with constant returns to
scale versus constant marginal returns to aggregate capital. For the sake of exposition, we
begin by considering a simple AK model of endogenous growth.
3 Habits, Fertility and Endogenous Growth
This section analyzes the competitive equilibrium of a decentralized economy under laissez-
faire. Consumption and saving choices are characterized by the optimality conditions described
in section 2, while the production sector is represented by pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. In order
to analyze situations with linear returns to aggregate capital, we consider Romer￿ s (1989)
speci￿cation of learning-by-doing. There exist J identical ￿rms, indexed by j, producing ~ y(j)
units of ￿nal good by employing ~ k(j) units of capital and ‘(j) units of labor. Each ￿rm￿ s
technology is represented by
~ y(j) = (~ k(j))￿ ￿
h(j)‘(j)
￿1￿￿ (18)
where h(j) parametrizes workers￿ability and is taken as given by every agent in the economy. In
the competitive equilibrium, factor prices thus equal marginal productivities de￿ned at given
ability levels. Since ￿rms are of identical size, they employ identical amounts of inputs and
produce the same output level, ~ y(j) = ~ y. Aggregate output Y = J~ y equals Y = K￿L1￿￿, where
K = J~ k is aggregate capital and L = hJ‘ = hNy is aggregate e¢ cient labor (recall that labor
is supplied by the young cohort only). The engine of growth is knowledge accumulation due to
learning-by-doing. Following Romer (1989), workers￿knowledge is a⁄ected by an aggregated
externality: h is positively related to the capital stock per-worker, kt ￿ Kt=N
y
t , according to
the linear relation
ht = ￿kt = ￿(Kt=N
y
t );
where the constant ￿ > 0 represents the intensity of learning-by-doing. Substituting this
relation in the aggregate production function, we obtain Yt = AKt, where the marginal social
return from capital, A ￿ ￿1￿￿, is constant over time. The marginal private return from capital
equals the equilibrium interest rate
r = ￿A < A; (19)
which is constant over time. Since the equilibrium wage rate reads
w = (1 ￿ ￿)(Yt=N
y
t ); (20)
we can substitute (19) and Kt+1 = N
y
t st in (2)-(3) to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
of the economy,
Kt+1 = AKt ￿ Ct ￿ Et: (21)
7where Ct ￿ N
y
t ct and Et = No
t et represent aggregate consumption of young and old agents,
respectively. Exploiting (14)-(16), individual consumption and fertility choices imply the
following
Lemma 1 In an interior solution, aggregate consumption of both cohorts grows at the same
constant rate
Ct+1=Ct = Et+1=Et = ￿￿A (22)






￿A￿ + " + "￿
: (23)
Expression (23) embodies the reallocation e⁄ect induced by habit formation. A higher "
corresponds to a stronger willingness to postpone consumption in order to overcome historical
standards of living, and results into higher shares of output consumed by old agents in each
period. Expression (22) is conceptually analogous to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, and suggests
that a typical balanced growth equilibrium arises in the economy, at least in terms of aggregate
variables. We use italics in order to stress that positive net growth in aggregate output is not
necessarily associated with a continuous rise in individual consumption: equilibrium fertility
rates generally di⁄er from output growth rates, so that declining per capita incomes due to
excessive birth rates - or increasing per capita incomes induced by declining population - are
not remote possibilities. This point will be addressed immediately after the necessary proof
of knife-edge balanced growth:






￿A(￿ + ￿) + "(1 + ￿)
(24)
in each period, and the economy exhibits a balanced growth path with
Kt+1=Kt = Yt+1=Yt = ￿￿A (25)
in each period t = 0;:::;1.
An important consequence of knife-edge balanced growth is that individual bequests grow
at the same rate as individual consumption. In particular, the e⁄ect of habit formation is to
reduce equilibrium bequests relative to ￿rst-period consumption. To see this formally, de￿ne















Since ￿ < 1, it follows from (26) that, if a steady-state zss > 0 exists, the bequest-consumption
ratio jumps at this stationary level at t = 0, and is constant thereafter. Imposing stationarity












8Expression (27) implies that bequests are operative (zss > 0) only if the term in square




￿A + " + ￿ (￿A + ")
￿A￿ + " + ￿ (￿A + ")
: (28)
Satisfying the above inequality is a necessary condition to have interior solutions to the dynas-
tic problem. We thus restrict our attention to combinations of parameters that satisfy (28).
From (27), the e⁄ect of an increase in the strength of habits is that of reducing equilibrium
















We now have all the elements to analyze equilibrium fertility rates. The following Propositions
show that (i) the equilibrium fertility rate is negatively related to the strength of habits, and
that (ii) positive population growth is compatible with increasing per capita incomes only if
the degree of habit formation falls within a precise range of values.
Proposition 3 Along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium fertility rate is constant: popula-









with @nss=@" < 0 (stronger habits reduce population growth).
Proposition 3 has an intuitive interpretation. Habits induce a bias in intertemporal choices
that produces a reallocation in favor of second-period consumption. Given the trade-o⁄ be-
tween consumption when old and resources available for bequest, agents are made more ￿ ego-
tist￿by stronger habits - in the sense that they will reduce fertility rates in order to make
parental altruism less costly.
A peculiar feature of this model is that habit formation does not modify the growth rate
of aggregate output, while it determines fertility rates. This implies that habits modify the
dynamics of individual incomes leaving output growth una⁄ected at the economy level. In
particular, positive growth in aggregate output is not necessarily associated with growing
population and increasing consumption per capita. As shown below, this situation arises only
if " lies within de￿nite boundaries.
Proposition 4 Assume that parameters are compatible with positive growth in aggregate out-
put and positive bequests (￿￿A > 1 and zss > 0). There generally exist a couple of critical
levels "0 and "00, with "0 < "00, such that " = "0 implies nss = ￿￿A > 1, and " = "00 implies
nss = 1. As a consequence, we may have three cases:
i. (Extinction path) if " > "00 population declines and per capita incomes grow faster than
aggregate output;
ii. (Overcrowding) if " < "0 population grows at higher rates than aggregate output, implying
declining per capita incomes;
9iii. (Non-degenerate growth) if "0 < " < "00, aggregate output, per capita incomes, and popu-
lation increase over time.
Proposition 4 directly follows from @nss=@" < 0, and draws a clear-cut distinction between
the dynamics of aggregate versus per capita variables. In case (i), habits are very strong
and consumption per capita grows faster than aggregate output. The excessive willingness to
consume prompts agents to choose low fertility rates, associated with declining population,
nss < 1, and this process brings the economy to a halt in the long run. In the opposite
situation - case (ii) - habits are very weak and fertility rates are too high to guarantee sustained
consumption standards for future generations: the gross rate of population growth exceeds
￿￿A, and individual incomes decline over time. The bottom-line is that positive growth in
aggregate output is associated with growing population and increasing per capita incomes if
and only if the coe¢ cient of habit formation falls within de￿nite boundaries - i.e. the case
of ￿ non-degenerate growth￿arising when "0 < " < "00. Numerical substitutions suggest that
fertility rates are quite sensitive to the coe¢ cient of habit formation: in the example reported
in Figure 1, the values for " delimiting non-generate growth are "0 = 3:24% and "00 = 4:89%.
If the coe¢ cient of habit formation lies outside this interval, overcrowding or extinction paths
immediately arise.6
The above results are useful in clarifying the negative impact of habits on equilibrium
fertility rates. The knife-edge character of the balanced-growth path clearly hinges on the
assumption of linear returns, and a ￿xed interest rate makes the economy￿ s growth rate in-
dependent of population growth. Results change in the neoclassical model, where decreasing
marginal returns to capital imply that accumulation rates, and therefore economic growth,
are crucially determined by fertility rates. This implies that habit formation modi￿es the
economy￿ s growth rate both in the short and in the long run, as shown below.
4 Habits, Fertility and Neoclassical Growth
The neoclassical speci￿cation is easily obtained by ruling out learning-by-doing from the pre-
vious model. Assuming that h is a ￿xed constant in ￿rms￿technologies (18), we can de￿ne








where K now exhibits decreasing marginal returns. In terms of capital per-worker, kt ￿
Kt=N
y
t , the intensive-form technology reads yt = f (kt) = Hk
￿
t , and equilibrium rates of
reward equal
rt = f0 (kt) = ￿Hk
￿￿1
t and wt = (1 ￿ ￿)f (kt): (32)
6See Figure 1. For a baseline non-degenerate value of " = 4%, gross per-period rates of growth of aggregate
output, population and consumption per capita respectively equal Yt+1=Yt = 1:2, nss = 1:11, and ct+1=ct =
1:085. Setting " = 6% yields an extinction path with declining population and excessive consumption growth
(nss = 0:88 and ct+1=ct = 1:36). The specular case is obtained with " = 2%, associated with overcrowding
(nss = 1:36 and ct+1=ct = 0:88).
10The aggregate constraint of the economy and the ￿rst order conditions imply the following
dynamic relations:
ntkt+1 = f (kt) ￿ ct ￿ (et=nt￿1); (33)
et+1 = ct
￿
￿f0 (kt+1) + "(1 + ￿)
￿
; (34)









[(1 ￿ ￿)f (kt+1)￿t+1 ￿ (1 + ￿)]; (36)
￿tct = f0 (kt+1)
￿
f0 (kt+1) + "
￿￿1 : (37)
Expression (33) is the aggregate constraint of the economy in terms of capital per-worker;
equations (34)-(35) are the optimality conditions (17) and (11); expressions (36)-(37) are
derived in the Appendix and characterize the joint dynamics of shadow prices and fertility
rates along the optimal path. We begin our analysis by studying the characteristics of the
steady-state equilibrium. Subsequently, we validate the usual interpretation of the steady-state
equilibrium as the long-run equilibrium of the economy by means of a numerical simulation
that analyzes transitional dynamics (section 4.2).
4.1 Steady-state analysis
Imposing steady-state conditions in system (33)-(37), and denoting by subscript ￿ ￿￿stationary
values, we obtain
n￿k￿ = f (k￿) ￿ c￿ ￿ (e￿=n￿); (38)
e￿ = c￿
￿
￿f0 (k￿) + "(1 + ￿)
￿
; (39)









[(1 ￿ ￿)f (k￿)￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)]; (41)
c￿￿￿ = f0 (k￿)
￿
f0 (k￿) + "
￿￿1 : (42)
which is a system of ￿ve equations in ￿ve unknowns (n￿;k￿;c￿;e￿;￿￿). As shown in the
Appendix, the equilibrium condition determining the stationary fertility rate can be written
as
ga (n￿) = gb (n￿); (43)
where
ga (n￿) = n￿
￿; (44)
gb (n￿) =
￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿




The equilibrium can be characterized by studying the properties of (44) and (45). We will label
as ￿ well-de￿ned￿the equilibria associated with n￿ > 0, and as ￿ feasible￿only those implying
n￿ > ￿. The reason for the latter restriction is that, from (40), a candidate equilibrium with
n￿ < ￿ would imply f0 (k￿) < 1 - that is, negative net rents from capital. It is instructive to
begin with the case of inactive habits.
11Proposition 5 If habits are inactive, " = 0, the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 5 is described in Figure 2, which represents the equilibrium condition (43) in
the gi ￿ n￿ plane. When " = 0, function gb (n￿) reduces to a horizontal straight line. Since
ga (n￿) is strictly increasing and ga (0) = 0, there can be only one intersection, associated with
condition (43). The resulting equilibrium is well-de￿ned and feasible provided that parameters
are such that n￿ > ￿ (see Appendix).





"￿ (1 ￿ ￿)






2"￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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3 < 0:
Since ga (n￿) and gb (n￿) are both increasing and concave, proving the uniqueness of the
equilibrium is not trivial. It is however possible to characterize long-run equilibria in the
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Expression (46) implies that a ceteris paribus increase in " moves gb (n￿) south-west in the
gi ￿ n￿ plane. Expression (47) follows from (45), and asserts that gb (n￿) is asymptotically
horizontal and bounded from above by the value associated with inactive habits, lim"!0 gb (n￿).
These results imply that, starting from the case of inactive habits, subsequent increases in "
generate downward shifts in the gb (n￿) function for any positive fertility rate. Since ga (n￿)
is increasing and independent of habits, all intersections satisfying the equilibrium condition
ga = gb will necessarily be associated with lower fertility rates with respect to the case " = 0.
This result is described in the left graphs of Figure 2, where the highest equilibrium fertility
rate is the habit-free value, denoted as nmax.
Being both ga (n￿) and gb (n￿) concave, we may have either one or multiple intersections
satisfying (43). Diagram (a) in Figure 2 considers a unique intersection. This case can be





The above inequality implies that limn￿!0 gb (n￿) > 0, so that the vertical intercept of gb is
higher than ga (0) = 0. Given a unique equilibrium, condition (43) holds with gb (n￿) cutting




implies that the vertical intercept of gb is negative (limn￿!0 gb (n￿) < 0). In Figure 2 (b),
positive values of " yield two intersections, such as those denoted as n0 and n00 with " = 0:15.
12The ￿ high￿intersection n00 has the same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in Diagram
(a). The ￿ low￿intersection n0, instead, satis￿es the condition ga = gb with gb (n￿) cutting
ga (n￿) from below. The existence of multiple intersections, however, does not generally imply
multiple equilibria. Although n0 seems a potential candidate, ￿ low￿equilibria do not pass any
numerical test of feasibility. In our simulations, n0 < ￿ appears to hold in general, as we
could not ￿nd any constellation of parameters for which low intersections represent a feasible
equilibrium. Since multiple feasible equilibria do not arise in practice, there is no loss of
generality in restricting the analysis to equilibria where gb (n￿) cuts ga (n￿) from above: this
is the only possible equilibrium in case (a), and the only feasible equilibrium, n00, in case (b)
of Figure 2.
This characterization of feasible equilibria has three main implications. First, a ceteris
paribus increase in the strength of habits reduces the optimal fertility rate in any feasible
steady state. As shown in the left graphs of Figure 2, gb shifts downward following an increase
in ", and the equilibrium fertility rate consequently shrinks.
Second, whenever a feasible equilibrium exists without habits, there always exists a range
of positive values of " for which feasible equilibria also exist with habit formation. In fact, if
nmax > ￿, it is always possible to de￿ne a critical value of habit formation "￿ > 0 such that
" = "￿ implies an equilibrium with n￿ = ￿. This critical level can be calculated by imposing
n￿ = ￿ in condition (43) to obtain
"￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿￿)[￿(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)[￿￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)] + (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (48)
Given Proposition 5 and result (46), any value of " exceeding "￿ would generate equilibria




yields feasible steady-state equilibria. This is the range of values of " that
is relevant for studying the long-run behavior of the system. In graphical terms, the ￿ relevant
region￿is represented by the grey-shaded areas in the right graphs of Figure 2.
Third, if parameters allow for positive population growth when habits are inactive, there
always exists a critical degree of habit formation associated with constant population, and a
subset of feasible equilibria where population declines due to the presence of habits:
Lemma 6 Provided that nmax > 1, there exists a critical value ￿ " < "￿ such that " = ￿ " implies
n￿ = 1. Hence, the set of feasible equilibria with " > 0 includes two subsets of equilibria
respectively associated with n￿ > 1 and n￿ < 1.
The intuition behind Lemma 6 is that, since ￿ < 1, the special case of constant population
n￿ = 1 > ￿ lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure 2. The consequence is that
di⁄erent degrees of habit persistence determine whether long-run population growth rates
will be positive or negative. On the one hand, this result looks similar to that found in the
AK model: strong habit persistence may imply declining population. On the other hand, the
assumption of decreasing returns to capital yields quite di⁄erent implications for the economy￿ s
growth rate. In the stationary equilibrium of the neoclassical model, consumption and capital
per worker are constant, and aggregate output grows at the same rate as population. Formally,
since f0 (k￿) = ￿Hk
￿￿1








13and implies that Kt+1=Kt = Nt+1=Nt = Yt+1=Yt = n￿ in this equilibrium. Hence, habit
formation modi￿es the economy￿ s growth rate through the fertility rate. This is an important
di⁄erence with respect to previous literature on habit formation (see section 5), and also with
respect to the AK model of section 3. The characteristics of the neoclassical equilibrium are
summarized in the following
Proposition 7 Provided that nmax > 1, we may have three cases: (i) if 0 < " < ￿ ", the steady-
state equilibrium features increasing output and population; (ii) if ￿ " < " < "￿, the steady-state
equilibrium features declining output and population; (iii) if " = ￿ ", the steady-state equilibrium
features constant output and population.
Proposition 7 can interpreted as follows. Households internalize the e⁄ect of habits in their
bequest and saving motives, reducing fertility in order to make parental altruism less costly.
However, in a neoclassical world, fertility determines the economy￿ s growth rate, which remains
strictly positive if and only if habits are relatively weak, " < ￿ ". Excessive habit formation,
" > ￿ ", induces long-run equilibria where constant per capita incomes are associated with falling
population and declining aggregate output.
4.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The previous section postulates the usual interpretation of the steady-state equilibrium as the
long-run equilibrium of the economy. Two questions that still have to be addressed relate
to the dynamic stability of the stationary equilibrium, and the e⁄ects of habit formation on
transitional dynamics. The starting point of the analysis is a three-by-three dynamic system
that is obtained from suitable substitutions in (33)-(37). As shown in the Appendix, the
dynamic behavior of the economy is fully determined by three equations involving the crucial

























[(1 ￿ ￿)f (kt+1)￿t+1 ￿ (1 + ￿)]
￿1=￿
: (52)
From (50)-(52), the evolution of capital per capita depends on the expected interest rate, and
the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by equation (50) for a given set of parameters
f￿;H;￿;￿;￿;￿;"g.7 As before, it is instructive to begin with the case of inactive habits. In
this case, it is possible to show analytically that " = 0 implies no transition in fertility rates.
7 The existence of habits (" > 0) makes the dynamics of capital per worker dependent on the expected interest
rate, as the presence of f
0 (kt+1) in the right-hand-side of (50) elucidates. Hence, kt+1 is (only) implicitly given














where kt+1 does not appear anymore in the right-hand-side.
14Proposition 8 When habits are inactive, the fertility rate is constant at each point in time
along the optimal path.
The intuition behind Proposition 8 is provided by the equilibrium condition for consump-




￿ (rt + ")rt+1
(rt+1 + ")[￿rt + "(1 + ￿)]
: (53)
Expression (53) shows that the shares of output going to young and old agents are generally
time-varying, as they depend on capital accumulation. Setting " = 0, however, expression
(53) reduces to Ct=Et = ￿=￿. Proposition 8 can thus be interpreted as follows: in the presence
of habits, the allocation of output among cohorts varies over time because individual choices
adjust to changing standards of living during the development process. Since the number of
kids is determined by utility maximization, this mechanism characterizes both consumption
and fertility choices. Without habits, output allocation is time-invariant as no adjustment in
consumption, nor in fertility rates, is called for by changing standards of living.
In general, the presence of habits yields transitional variations in fertility rates. Given the
complexity of the dynamic system (33)-(37), this issues can only be addressed numerically.
As a ￿rst step, we have considered several di⁄erent constellations of parameters, and derived
the respective eigenvalues from the Jacobian matrix. In this regard, numerical results show
that the model exhibits saddle-point stability for a wide range8 of parameters￿values, with
one stable and two unstable eigenvalues. As a second step, we perform a numerical simulation
of the full dynamics of the economy along the optimal path, with a special focus on the
transitional impact of habits on fertility decisions. In order to circumvent the disadvantages
of methods based on linearization, we use backward iteration to characterize approximate
solutions to the Euler equations (Strulik and Brunner, 2002; Heer and Maussner, 2005; see
Appendix for details). As noted above (footnote 7), the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly
determined by equation (50) for a given set of parameters f￿;H;￿;￿;￿;￿;"g, and determine
the respective entries in the Jacobian matrix of the system by applying the implicit-function
theorem. As a benchmark-case, we specify the set of parameters as
￿ = 0:7, H = 10, ￿ = 1:5, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:6, " = 0:05;
which implies, in light of (38)-(42), the steady-state values
c￿ = 39:61, e￿ = 63:77, n￿ = 1:306, b￿ = 57:91, k￿ = 48:99, ￿￿ = 0:0246:









































8We did ￿nd evidence of possible non-saddle-point stability with indeterminate initial conditions for the jump
variables, induced by very high values of ￿ and " with ￿ > ￿. In these cases, however, the long-run equilibrium
features implausible values for fertility rates and output growth, so that the general result of saddle-point stable
equilibrium is robust to a wide range of parameters￿combinations.














With two unstable eigenvalues (￿1;￿2 > 1) and one real stable eigenvalue (￿3 < 1), the
dynamic system (50)-(52) exhibits saddle-point stability with monotone convergence. The
results of the numerical exercises are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
We analyze the e⁄ect of habits by considering three scenarios: (i) " = 0, represented by
the solid line; (ii) " = 0:05, dashed line; and (iii) " = 0:10, dotted line. Looking at Figure 3, it
becomes apparent that habits do not play an important role in very early stages of economic
development. However, as parents internalize the existence of habits in their bequest and
fertility choices, the e⁄ects become relevant as the economy becomes richer. Since habits
prompts agents to reallocate more resources in favor of second-period consumption, savings
increase with the strength of habits, thereby fuelling capital accumulation. In order to reduce
the private cost of having children - which, in the present model, takes the form of bequests -
agents choose lower fertility rates for higher values of the habit coe¢ cient.
Figure 4 embodies two results. First, by virtue of the mechanism mentioned above, fertility
rates decline during the transition, i.e. net population growth rates are progressively reduced
by economic development. Second, the simulation con￿rms Proposition 8, by which fertility
rates are constant during the transition when " = 0. In other words, the ￿ demographic
transition￿depicted in Figure 4 is exclusively due to habit formation.
It should be stressed that the assumption of logarithmic preferences in consumption is
relevant for Proposition 8. If consumption preferences display an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution di⁄erent from unity, the allocation of consumption over the life-cycle is a⁄ected
by interest rates, independently of the presence of habits. In this case, consumption shares are
generally time-varying in the short run, and fertility rates likely exhibit transitional dynam-
ics even without habits. Hence, the transitional e⁄ects of habits on fertility would interact
with those stemming from non-logarithmic preferences. However, our long-run results should
remain valid even with other types of preferences. The reason is that the reallocation e⁄ect
- i.e. the fact that habits reduce the amount of bequests - is a general mechanism that does
not hinge on logarithmic forms. As shown by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) - who assume
exogenous population growth - habits make the operativeness of bequests less likely, because
habit persistence tends to contrast dynastic altruism even with generic additive preferences.
Building on this mechanism, the peculiar result of our model remains: given the possibility of
modifying the fertility rate, agents are able to reduce the total cost of bequests by decreasing
the number of children. In this respect, notice that our assumption of logarithmic preferences
may increase, rather than limit, the generality of our conclusions. The reason is that, in both
the AK and the neoclassical model presented above, the negative long-run impact of habits
arises without making ad-hoc assumptions of complementarity, or substitutability, between
consumption and fertility in individual preferences.
5 Connections with previous literature
With respect to previous literature on demographic transition, the main distinctive feature of
our analysis is given by our main result: habit formation - and, in general, status-dependent
16preferences - may constitute an important part of the explanations for the decline of fertility
rates exhibited by developed economies. To our knowledge, previous studies did not address
this issue. The old-age security approach postulates that present fertility choices are driven
by the expectation that children will provide support to their parents in the future, so that
variations in equilibrium fertility rates are determined by uncertainty over future incomes
(Nishimura and Zhang, 1995), and tangled to the degree of risk aversion (Sah, 1991). In
the Barro-Becker framework, children provide direct utility to their parents, and the fertility
decline may be due to increased productivity from technological progress (Galor and Weil,
2000), rising real wages that increase the opportunity cost of having children (Galor and Weil,
1996), and possible trade-o⁄s between the quality and quantity of children (Becker 1991). In
this regard, we may stress that our results do not build on the argument that economic devel-
opment raises the opportunity cost of having children through interactions with technological
development or capital accumulation. In the present analysis, the central element is the psy-
chological cost of having children: low fertility rates originate in the distorted perception of
￿ joy from consumption￿that old agents have in the second period of life. Our reasoning also
di⁄ers from explanations based on quality-quantity trade-o⁄s. If parents reduce the number
of children in order to provide better education to each successor, the roots of low fertility
rates are to be found in parental altruism, whereas our analysis suggests the conclusion -
perhaps less pleasant, but worth considering - that the source of low fertility rates is parental
￿ egothism￿induced by habits. From a broader perspective, the present analysis seems comple-
mentary to the related literature on Malthusian stagnation and demographic transition - e.g.
Galor and Weil (2000), Boldrin and Jones (2002). These contributions explicitly model the
rise and overlap of di⁄erent phases of development, and characterize demographic transitions
by considering the interactions between fertility, factors availability and technology improve-
ments. As we have emphasized the interactions between fertility and preferences, extending
the present analysis to include technological transitions seems an interesting topic for future
research.
The central role of bequests in our results suggests some similarities between our approach
and that followed by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who argue that population dynamics
are crucially governed by the direction of intergenerational transfers. Blackburn and Cipriani
(2005) assume two-sided altruism generates development paths consistent with the Caldwell
hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982): low-development is associated with young-to-old transfers and
large family size, whereas high-development phases feature lower fertility and old-to-young
transfers. With respect to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), our analysis is di⁄erent in both
aims and means. At the formal level, the models di⁄er in two important ways. First, we
rule out two-sided altruism, and focus on equilibrium paths with operative bequests - that
is, transfers are ￿ father-to-son￿by construction. Second, habits are not considered in Black-
burn and Cipriani (2005), whereas they represent the central feature of our analysis. At the
conceptual level, our aim is di⁄erent. Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) formalize the Caldwell
hypothesis, and reproduce the demographic transition along these lines by considering pos-
sible switch-overs in the direction of transfers. In this paper, we asked whether persistently
low fertility rates can also be explained by time-dependent preferences, arguing that the stage
of development a⁄ects population growth because agents internalize previous standards of
living into their bequest motives and fertility choices. Our reasoning is referred to the em-
pirical evidence on the intertemporal behavior of consumers, and is also consistent with less
recent historical facts. In the 18th century, the nobility pursued low-reproduction strategies
17in order to avoid the partition of the family property and maintain family status (Johansson,
1987). In the 19th century, similar strategies were intentionally adopted by the bourgeoisie
and land-owners, gradually spreading across other social classes (Haines, 1992).
With respect to the literature on habit formation and economic growth, a ￿rst remark
relates to the neoclassical model. In their seminal paper, Ryder and Heal (1973) show that
habits do not modify the long run equilibrium of the economy, as the Ramsey model with
in￿nite horizons predicts convergence towards the usual ￿ modi￿ed golden rule￿ . In section
4, we have shown that habit formation modi￿es the long-run growth rate of the economy
instead. The reason for our result is not the assumption of ￿nite lifetimes,9 but rather that
of endogenous fertility: habits matter because they a⁄ect the equilibrium fertility rate, and
thereby the growth rate of aggregate output in any equilibrium with stationary income per
capita. This result can be seen in parallel with that of Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004),
which asserts that habit formation becomes relevant for long-run growth when production
possibilities are improved by exogenous productivity growth in the Ramsey model. A second
remark is related to models with overlapping generations. A comparable framework is that
employed by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), who study a three-period OLG model with habit
formation and inherited tastes. As we pointed out in section 4.2, one of the results of Alonso-
Carrera et al. (2007) can be identi￿ed with the ￿rst logical step of our reasoning: habits tend
to contrast dynastic altruism. Di⁄erently from Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) - who assume
exogenous population growth - our model features endogenous fertility, which allows us to show
that habits contrast population growth because habit formation prompts agents to reduce the
cost of parental altruism in the second period of life.
6 Conclusion
The recent growth literature proposes a number of explanations for (i) the low fertility rates
currently observed in developed economies, and (ii) the phenomenon known as ￿ demographic
transition￿ . Theoretical contributions considered fertility choices under old-age security mo-
tives, or satisfaction-based approaches ￿ la Barro and Becker (1989). In the Barro-Becker
framework, children provide direct utility to their parents, and the demographic transition
may be due to increased productivity generated by technological progress, rising costs of child
rearing, possible trade-o⁄s between the quality and quantity of children, and the reversal in
the direction of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we have argued that economic de-
velopment may a⁄ect population dynamics through a di⁄erent channel, i.e. the interactions
between fertility choices and habit formation in consumption. Most theoretical models with
endogenous fertility assume that consumption choices are based on standard time-separable
preferences, though a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that preferences are status-
dependent in reality. Building on this point, we have studied fertility choices and habit
formation in an overlapping generations model, assuming that the opportunity cost of having
children is determined by bequests. In this setting, habits contrast dynastic altruism through
status-e⁄ects. Our reasoning may be linked to the empirical observation that low-reproduction
strategies have historically been intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property
9If we drop the assumption of endogenous fertility, we obtain an OLG model with dynastic altruism which
yields identical predictions to the Ramsey model with ￿nite horizons, provided that bequests are operative in
each period along the equilibrium path (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002: Chap.5).
18and status (Johansson, 1987; Haines, 1992).
A ￿rst general result is that habits reduce population growth. The reason is that, due to
habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor of second-period consumption, and
agents aim at reducing the loss in second-period utility induced by bequests. Being able to
choose the number of children, individuals reduce fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. We have studied this mechanism under two alternative technology speci￿cations.
In the neoclassical model, habits modify the economy￿ s growth rate and generate transitional
dynamics in fertility that are compatible with the phenomenon of demographic transition.
In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreas-
ing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK speci￿cation,
growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coe¢ cient
lie within de￿nite boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with
either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining pop-
ulation. In both frameworks, habits are responsible for the fertility decline, suggesting that
status-dependent preferences may have played an important role in the demographic transition
observed in developed economies.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From (19), condition (17) can be written as
et+1=ct = ￿A￿ + "(1 + "): (54)
Plugging vet+1 = (et+1 ￿ "ct)
￿1 in (10) and using (54) to substitute et+1 yields
ct￿t = ￿A(￿A + ")
￿1 : (55)
Combining (55) with (11) we obtain
ct+1nt = ct￿￿A: (56)
Since Ct+1=Ct = nt (ct+1=ct), the above expression implies a constant growth rate of aggregate




we obtain (23), which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2 De￿ne xt ￿ Kt=Ct. Dividing both sides of (21) by Ct+1, and





￿A(￿ + ￿) + "(1 + ￿)
(￿￿A)
2 ; (57)
which displays a unique steady-state solution
xss =
￿A(￿ + ￿) + "(1 + ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿A2 : (58)
For a given K0, the initial condition x0 is determined by the jump-variable C0. Since ￿￿ < 1,
the steady-state is unstable, and all the trajectories starting from x0 6= xss are explosive and
19non-optimal.10 Hence, variable x jumps at the steady-state level xss at time zero, and is
constant thereafter. From Lemma 1 and constraint (21), xt = xss at each t implies balanced
growth from time zero onwards in aggregate variables, with Kt, Yt, Ct, and Et all growing at
the constant rate ￿￿A. Since Kt=Ct = xss, we have Yt=Ct = (AKt=Ct)
￿1 = (Axss)
￿1, which
implies (24) after substituting (58).





wt + bt ￿ ct
















Since wt=ct = (1 ￿ ￿)(Yt=Ct), the ￿rst term in brackets equals (1 ￿ ￿) ￿1, implying equation
(26) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3 From (16), plugging ￿ unt = ￿￿n￿￿1
t in the ￿rst order
condition (13) gives ￿tbt+1 = ￿￿￿An￿￿1








Since bt+1 = zssct+1 in each period, expression (60) implies (30). Since @zss=@" < 0, it follows
from (30) that @nss=@" < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 Since the growth rate of aggregate output Yt+1=Yt = ￿￿A is
independent of habit formation, the non-ambiguous sign of the derivative @nss=@" < 0 implies
that there generally exist a couple of critical levels "0 and "00, with "0 < "00, such that " = "0
implies nss = ￿￿A > 1, and " = "00 implies nss = 1. For reasonable parameter values, both "0
and "00 are strictly positive, implying cases (i), (ii) and (iii) - see Figure 1.
Derivation of (36)-(37) Equation (37) is obtained by plugging vet+1 = (et+1 ￿ "ct)
￿1






ct [￿rt+1 + "(1 + ￿)]
rt+1
















10Explosive trajectories can ruled out following the standard argument. If x0 < xss, capital will become
negative in ￿nite time, violating the aggregate constraint of the economy. If x0 < xss, capital grows faster than
consumption of the young, i.e. limt!1 (Kt+1=Kt) > ￿￿A > ￿, but this path would violate the transversality
condition limt!1 ￿
tKt ￿ 0.


























Substituting (37) in (64) yields
untnt = ￿twt + unt￿1
￿t
￿t￿1








+ ￿twt ￿ (1 + ￿):
Substituting wt = (1 ￿ ￿)f (kt) and untnt = ￿￿n￿
t we obtain expression (36).
Derivation of (44)-(45) Using (39) to substitute e￿ in (38), and using (42) to sub-
stitute c￿ in the resulting expression, we have






f0 (k￿) + "
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Since f0 (k￿) = ￿Hk
￿￿1



























































[(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f (k￿)￿￿];








￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿




21De￿ning ga (n￿) = n￿
￿ and gb (n￿) as the right hand side of (68), this equilibrium condition
can be re-written as ga (n￿) = gb (n￿).




￿ (1 + ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
; (69)
As " ! 0, gb (n￿) becomes independent of n￿, and reduces to a horizontal line in the gi ￿ n￿
plane. Since 0 < ￿ < 1, the function ga (n￿) = n￿
￿ is strictly increasing in the gi ￿ n￿ plane,
and satis￿es ga (0) = 0. This implies that only one value n￿ > 0 may satisfy the equilibrium




￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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￿ (1 + ￿) ￿




The term in square brackets implies that there is a unique well-de￿ned equilibrium when
parameters satisfy






When (71) is violated, there is no well-de￿ned equilibrium, since the right hand side of (69) is
negative. The unique equilibrium is feasible if and only if the right hand side of (70) is greater
than ￿.
Proof of Lemma 6. If nmax > 1, there exists a critical value of habit formation "￿ > 0
for which we obtain an equilibrium n￿ = ￿. Being gb (n￿;") strictly declining in ", well-de￿ned
equilibria are characterized by values of " lying in the interval 0 ￿ " < "￿. Since ￿ < 1, the
equilibrium n￿ = 1 is feasible, i.e. it lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure
2. Since @gb=@" < 0, the equilibrium n￿ = 1 is associated with a critical value of the habit
coe¢ cient ￿ " such that 0 < ￿ " < "￿. As a consequence, there exists a subset of well-de￿ned
equilibria associated with growing population (characterized by 0 < " < ￿ " and n￿ > 1), and
another subset associated with declining population (characterized by ￿ " < " < "￿ and n￿ < 1).
Proof of Proposition 7. From Lemma 6, if " falls in the intervals mentioned in cases
(i), (ii) and (iii), we respectively have increasing, decreasing, and constant population. The
proof is completed by recalling that Yt+1=Yt = n￿ holds in the steady-state by virtue of (49).
Derivation of (50)-(52) Equations (51)-(52) directly follow from (35)-(36). Equa-
tion (50) can be obtained as follows. Re-writing (52) at time t and substituting ￿t =
rt+1 [ct (rt+1 + ")]
￿1 from (37) we get
￿t￿1ct =
￿rt+1rt
nt￿1 (rt+1 + ")
: (72)
Substituting ￿t￿1 = rt [ct￿1 (rt + ")]





(rt+1 + ")[￿rt + "(1 + ￿)]
￿rt+1 (rt + ")
: (73)
22Plugging (73) in (33), and substituting (37) to eliminate ct we obtain
ntkt+1 = f (kt) ￿
f0 (kt+1)
￿t (f0 (kt+1) + ")
￿
1 +
(f0 (kt+1) + ")[￿f0 (kt) + "(1 + ￿)]
￿f0 (kt+1)(f0 (kt) + ")
￿
; (74)
which implies (50) in the text.
Simulation method. Backward iteration requires to determine an initial value to
evaluate the time-reversed system up to a termination criterion, and to revert the obtained
sequence of solutions. Since the analytical selection of an initial value on the stable manifold
is generally not available, the initial value is given by a point in the neighborhood of the
steady state. A good approximation is obtained by making use of the stable eigenvector of










where di represents the initial deviation from the equilibrium and dd de￿nes the direction. The
initial values (k0;￿0;n0) are set equal to (kt+1;￿t+1;nt+1) and the system (50)-(52) is solved
backward for (kt;￿t;nt), and so on. Subsequent iterations show that the approximations of
the linearized system serve as a good ￿rst guess for the solution of the system of equations.








































where P contains the eigenvectors p1;p2;p3, and A1;A2;A3 represent arbitrary constants.
Since, ￿1;￿2 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A2 = 0, such that
kt = p3;1A3￿t
3 + k￿ (75)
￿t = p3;2A3￿t
3 + ￿￿ (76)
nt = p3;3A3￿t
3 + n￿: (77)
Since, k0 is given, A3 is obtained as k0￿k￿
e3;1 = A3.
Proof of Proposition 8. Multiplying both terms of (50) by ￿t+1 and substituting
(51) we obtain




￿f0(kt+1) + "(1 + ￿)
￿(f0(kt+1) + ")
: (78)
Since f0(kt+1) = rt+1 and kt+1f0(kt+1) = ￿f(kt+1), we can de￿ne the shadow value of output























which displays a unique steady-state Qss =
￿+￿
￿(1￿￿￿). Since ￿￿ < 1, this steady-state is unstable,
and explosive paths can be ruled out as suboptimal: if limt!1 Qt = ￿1 capital per worker
must become negative in ￿nite time, whereas limt!1 Qt = +1 would violate the transversality
condition limt!1 ￿tkt = 0. Hence, when habits are inactive, the shadow value of output per
capita jumps at Qss at time zero, and stays there forever (this result is intuitive, since (37)
implies that, when " = 0, the shadow value of ￿rst-period consumption is constant and equal
to unity at each point in time). The fact that Qt = Qss in each t implies that fertility rates









[(1 ￿ ￿)Qt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿)]: (81)
If " = 0 we have Qt+1 = Qss, and (81) displays an unstable steady-state in fertility rates.
Ruling out explosive paths that would make nt diverge to plus/minus in￿nity, the only possible
equilibrium with inactive habits is characterized by Qt = Qss and nt = nmax at each point in
time, which completes the proof.




￿ (rt+1 + ")rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ")
:




￿ (rt+1 + ")rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ")[￿rt+1 + "(1 + ￿)]
:
Multiplying both sides by N
y
t+1=No
t+1, and recalling that No
t+1 = N
y




￿ (rt+1 + ")rt+2
(rt+2 + ")[￿rt+1 + "(1 + ￿)]
which implies (53) in the text.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of population and individual consumption (1st period) for different values of e. 
Parameter values are b = 0.75, g = d = s = 0.5, A = 4, and m = 0.6. Non-degenerate growth arises in all 
paths falling in the grey-shaded areas delimited by the critical values e¢ and e¢¢.   29 
 
Figure 2: Long-run equilibria in the neoclassical model for different values of e. Diagram (a): unique 
intersections  g
a  =  g
b  and  feasible  equilibria.  Diagram  (b):  multiple  intersections  g
a  =  g
b  and  unique 
feasible equilibria.   30 
 
Figure 3: Transitional dynamics of capital per capita, consumption, bequests, and savings per capita for 







Figure 4: Transitional dynamics of fertility rates for increasing strength of habits.  Working Papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
(PDF-ﬁles of the Working Papers can be downloaded at www.cer.ethz.ch/research).
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